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Abstract: As with most great works of art, great films are typically amenable to
multiple interpretations, and there need be no determinate answer to which inter-
pretation is ‘right’ or even the ‘best’. Yet some interpretations can render a work
more compelling – perhaps more morally or religiously deep – than others. And
that might be one reason for preferring the interpretation in question. This article
focuses on Woody Allen’s Crimes and Misdemeanors, which has often been con-
strued as an attempt to illustrate the thesis that crime sometimes pays (or, at any
rate, that it is not the case that crime necessarily does not pay). I call this the un-
just reading of the film and contrast it with the just reading. I argue, however, that
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both these readings presuppose a consequentialist conception of justice that is not
the only conception available. Reinterpreted from a perspective of intrinsic justice,
the film gains a depth that is unavailable in the light of the other interpretations.
Assumptions about ethical and religious matters can sometimes lead us to
interpret a work of art in unduly narrow terms, obscuring from view other
possible interpretations. Rather than allowing the work to challenge our
assumptions and broaden our ethical and religious horizons, we let our as-
sumptions guide our reading – or viewing – of the work. Among the films
that have suffered this fate is Woody Allen’s masterful tragicomedy Crimes
and Misdemeanors (1989). Many viewers have seen in this film the expression
of the thesis that crime sometimes pays – or, at any rate, an expression of
a counterexample to the thesis that crime necessarily does not pay.1 They
view it in these terms because they see one of its principal characters, Judah
Rosenthal (played by Martin Landau), appearing to overcome any ill conse-
quences of having paid his brother to hire a hitman to murder his troublesome
mistress.2 In short, such viewers treat the film as illustrating the contention
that, in at least some cases, it is possible to ‘get away with murder’.3 I call
this the unjust reading of the film because it assumes the film to be portray-
ing the absence of justice in the world. Meanwhile, other viewers – albeit a
minority – speculate that Judah has not, ultimately, got away with murder,
for they consider there to be reasons to suppose that, even if he has escaped
legal sanction, the psychological anxieties and pangs of remorse that afflicted
him immediately after the killing are liable to return. I call this the just
reading of the film.
What both these readings of Judah’s predicament at the end of the film
share is an assumption about what justice consists in – an assumption that
we might term consequentialist in nature. They assume, that is, that justice
consists in certain consequences or repercussions for the perpetrator of an
action. So, if someone were to perform a benevolent action, justice would
consist in the agent’s enjoying some reward. It could be a material reward,
such as a financial gift or a promotion, or a psychological reward, such as
a deepened sense of well-being or satisfaction; if no such reward were forth-
coming, then a disturbance in the balance of justice would have occurred.
Similarly, according to this assumption, the performance of a vicious action
ought, in a just world, to be followed by the suffering of some retributive
consequence on the part of the perpetrator. Again, this could be material
retribution, such as incarceration or a financial punishment, or, at the very
least, some psychological or emotional anguish resulting from the awareness
of having acted wrongly.
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Figure 1: Judah Rosenthal (Martin Landau) with his wife Miriam (Claire Bloom),
daughter Sharon (Stephanie Roth, front left) and Sharon’s fiancé, Chris (Gregg Edel-
man, front right). All stills are from the DVD of Crimes and Misdemeanors (Allen
2004 [1989]).
Without simply rejecting the just or unjust readings of the film, this ar-
ticle promotes a style of non-theoretical philosophising that actively seeks
alternative possible interpretations. By looking to see what assumptions un-
derlie existing interpretations, and considering whether those assumptions
are necessary or inevitable, it is often possible to disclose interpretive options
that are otherwise likely to be missed. Once disclosed, such alternative in-
terpretations may disrupt and challenge our ingrained presuppositions rather
than simply mirroring and reinforcing them. In this particular case, one al-
ternative line of interpretation derives from a non-consequentialist conception
of justice, which I designate the intrinsic justice view. By taking this view
seriously, it becomes possible to see Crimes and Misdemeanors in a different
ethical and religious light – a light that could plausibly be regarded as giving
it a deeper significance than other interpretations afford. In turn, the film
may enable us to sharpen our understanding of the sense that the intrinsic
justice view makes as a conception of justice. To this end, I shall discuss
each of the interpretive perspectives in turn, after having offered a concise
summary of the film’s plot.
I. SUMMARY OF THE PLOT
For reasons of space, my summary of the plot of Crimes and Misdemeanors
will be limited to aspects of the film that constitute the necessary background
to the interpretive disputes I proceed to discuss. The central character, Ju-
dah Rosenthal, is a wealthy and successful ophthalmologist; he is married to
Miriam and has a teenage daughter, Sharon. Early on, we learn that Judah
313
Getting Away with Murder?
has been having an affair for two years with an air stewardess named Dolores
Paley, who now wants to bring the affair out into the open. Judah would pre-
fer to end the affair and keep his marriage, but Dolores insists that she wants
to confront Miriam with the truth; she threatens to make public certain of
Judah’s financial indiscretions if he refuses to go along with her plan.
Judah confides in two people about his predicament: first, a rabbi named
Ben, who has a progressive eye disease and is a patient of Judah’s; and second,
Judah’s brother, Jack, who has connections with the criminal underworld.
Ben recommends that Judah confess to Miriam and ask for her forgiveness in
the hope that their marriage can get off to a fresh start and perhaps achieve
a deeper level. Jack, by contrast, suggests that if Judah can supply the cash,
he can have Dolores ‘gotten rid of’. Following much anxious reflection, Judah
eventually phones Jack and asks him to ‘move ahead with what we discussed’.4
After being informed by Jack that ‘it’s over and done with’, Judah shows
signs of guilt and remorse and considers confessing to the authorities. Jack
tells him he is ‘not gonna let that happen’, which Judah understands to be
an implicit threat. Judah continues to play along with the deception.
Figure 2: Judah with Dolores Paley (Anjelica Huston).
Several months pass by; the final scene of the film (before the epilogue)
depicts the wedding of Ben’s daughter, at which Judah and Miriam are among
the guests. By this time, Ben is completely blind; we learn that his brother
Lester has paid for the wedding, probably because Ben is no longer able to
work. At the wedding reception, Judah wanders into a darkened side room,
where he comes across Ben’s brother-in-law, Clifford Stern (played by Woody
Allen), who has been one of the main characters in the film’s comic subplot.
Clifford (‘Cliff’) is a small-time documentary filmmaker and Judah takes the
opportunity to obliquely tell him his own story as though it were a movie
plot. Speaking in the third person, Judah remarks that the murderer has
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managed to rationalise his previous actions and overcome his guilt: ‘maybe
once in a while he has a bad moment’, he says, ‘but it passes, and with time it
all fades’. Cliff protests that a genuinely tragic ending would require that the
murderer turns himself in, thereby accepting responsibility for his actions ‘in
the absence of a God or something’. But Judah responds that such endings
happen only in the movies, whereas he is ‘talking about reality’. This scene
ends with Judah exiting with his adoring wife through an archway reminiscent
of the chupah or Judaic wedding canopy – ‘this film’s most potent symbol of
happy endings’.5
The film’s epilogue comprises a montage of moments from earlier scenes
plus a prolonged shot of Ben dancing with his newly married daughter to the
tune of the song ‘I’ll Be Seeing You’ (composed by Sammy Fain). Accompa-
nying all of this is a voiceover spoken by Louis Levy (Martin Bergmann), a
philosophy professor about whom Cliff had been making a documentary until
Levy unexpectedly committed suicide. More will be said about this voiceover
in Section V below.
How one interprets Crimes and Misdemeanors’ moral message depends
on how one responds to many aspects of the film, but central among the
questions confronting the viewer are the following. First, is there a sense
in which Judah really has ‘got away with’ his crimes? Second, does Ben’s
physical blindness bear any symbolic relation to the ethical and religious
viewpoint he embodies? And third, to what extent does Professor Levy’s
suicide undermine the ostensibly hopeful philosophical perspective that he
had offered earlier in the film and which informs his final – post-mortem –
voiceover? I shall now consider three variant readings of the film, each of
which encompasses these issues.
II. THE ‘UNJUST’ READING
The first interpretation of Crimes and Misdemeanors to be considered here is
also the most common. I call it the unjust reading because it understands the
film’s message to be, in brief, that life is unjust: virtuous people, such as Ben,
often suffer, and people who commit evil, such as Judah, often prosper as a
consequence of their misdeeds. This interpretation is frequently allied with
the view that the film is fundamentally pessimistic about both human nature
and the possibility of ethical or philosophical knowledge, taking Professor
Levy’s suicide as evidence that, as one character in the film puts it, ‘No
matter how elaborate a philosophical system you work out, in the end it’s
gotta be incomplete’.6
This interpretation prevailed in early reviews of the film, with several crit-
ics expressing it in morally indignant terms. An extreme exemplar is Leon
Wieseltier, who declared it to be ‘a matter of honor to hate this film’, since
it contains not a single frame ‘that fails to degrade, to debase and to demean
something precious’; ultimately, the film ‘is a stain upon the culture that pro-
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Figure 3: Judah (right) with his brother Jack (Jerry Orbach).
duced it’.7 Although Wieseltier abjures reasoned deliberation in favour of ad
hominem condemnation, he is not alone in regarding Allen’s film as immoral
and anti-religious. Mary Erler, for instance, discerns the film’s overriding
message to be that ‘moral judgments are clearly irrelevant’, and Norman
Denzin writes that, according to the film, ‘those who commit the big crimes
are rewarded, and unpunished . . . There is no justice, no distinction between
the wicked and the righteous’.8
With regard to Judah’s situation at the end of the film, proponents of
the unjust reading emphasise that he has evaded prosecution and largely
overcome his earlier moral qualms. As Denzin puts it in his plot summary,
Judah ‘murders his mistress . . . gets away with it, suffers a small amount of
guilt . . . and in the end finds pleasure and love with his wife’.9 This reading
of Judah’s psychological condition is supported by a remark by Allen himself
in which he claims that Judah ‘feels no guilt and the extremely rare time the
events occur to him, his mild uneasiness (which sometimes doesn’t come at
all) is negligible’.10
Ben’s deteriorating eyesight is assumed by some critics to be a hackneyed
metaphor for the inadequacy of his moral vision and the redundancy of the
religious belief, alluded to during the film, that God’s eyes are upon us. Erler,
for one, reports being dismayed by the moment in the film’s opening scene
when, in a speech at an honorary dinner, Judah recalls how his father had
warned ‘that God’s eyes see everything’, to which Judah adds that this may
lie behind his own decision to become an ophthalmologist. ‘Our hearts sink’,
Erler opines, ‘as we see that the movie intends to link the largest of moral
questions – Is there a God? Is there a moral order? Is right action in the
world rewarded and evil punished? – with the exhausted metaphor of vision
as moral understanding.’11
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Figure 4: Judah Rosenthal and Clifford Stern (Woody Allen).
As for Professor Levy, an apparently decent man who survived the Holo-
caust: the unjust reading treats his moral and intellectual authority as being
undercut by his downfall, which is a very literal one. After all the lofty pre-
tensions exhibited in the interviews filmed by Clifford, we are informed that,
before jumping to his death, Levy left a note saying simply ‘I’ve gone out the
window’. One commentator suggests that, aside from its black comedic im-
pact, one of the things this note calls to mind is ‘the general fate of God and
morality in Crimes and Misdemeanors’.12 The film, it is supposed, portrays
a world in which both of these traditional aspects of human life have been
jettisoned and replaced by egoism and pretence.
III. THE ‘JUST’ READING
Is it, then, obviously the case that, as the unjust reading has it, Crimes and
Misdemeanors endorses the view that, owing to the absence of any cosmic
mechanism or overseer of justice, crime and immorality (at least sometimes)
pay? While no commentators that I know of have bluntly denied that this is
a possible way of understanding the film, many have argued that the film is
amenable to a more complex, perhaps ambiguous, interpretation; some have
defended what I will call a just reading, according to which the film subtly
gestures towards a degree of natural justice in the world.
From the perspective of the just reading, there are indications that Ju-
dah has not evaded punishment altogether, since it appears that he remains
haunted by the crime he has committed, and there are good reasons for sus-
pecting that his familial and other personal relationships will be detrimentally
affected by these psychological perturbations. As Sander Lee argues, against
Allen himself, ‘it is clear that Judah is lying, especially to himself, when he
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claims to have overcome his guilt. . . . Given what we have seen of his char-
acter, it is more likely that his high spirits at the film’s end are temporary,
and that, in the long run, he will secretly torment himself for the rest of his
life’.13
Proponents of this view also question the assumption that the film draws
a straightforward parallel between defective eyesight and a flawed moral vi-
sion. Indeed, several commentators have turned this contention on its head,
claiming that the film is in fact ‘[a]lluding to an old tradition’, according
to which ‘blindness [is] symbolic of inner sight’.14 ‘As Judah’s self-deception
becomes greater’, Edward Quattrocchi observes, ‘Ben conversely grows in
wisdom and compassion, as his glasses become more opaque and his eyesight
deteriorates.’15 On this view, there remains a sense in which Ben suffers phys-
ical impairment, but the symbolic significance of that impairment is radically
transformed.
Professor Levy’s suicide is harder to put a positive gloss on. Indeed, it is
hard to resist the suggestion of some critics that Levy’s failure to live out the
promise of his optimistic philosophy reveals the impotence of that philosophy
itself. But an advocate of the just reading might simply admit that Levy was
a basically honourable man who ultimately succumbed to depression, while
denying that this invalidates the aim of promoting goodness and justice in
the world.
IV. THE NOTION OF ‘INTRINSIC JUSTICE’
Both of the interpretations of Crimes and Misdemeanors that we have exam-
ined so far, though diverging from each other in important respects, share a
common conception of what being punished for a crime consists in – a con-
ception that is especially pertinent to how Judah’s situation is assessed. We
might reasonably call this a consequentialist conception, since it fixates on the
consequences of an action for the responsible agent. According to this con-
ception of punishment or justice, Judah will be punished for his crimes only if
he suffers some effect that is detrimental to his well-being, where ‘well-being’
is understood as a condition of which he, the subject, is consciously aware.
Thus, such an effect might be, or might involve, various eventualities, such as,
first, apprehension by the police and subjection to public condemnation and
legal sanction; second, disruption to his personal life or career or an inability
to maintain his work routine; or third, psychological torment, the recurrence
of feelings of guilt or remorse that gnaw away and frustrate his chances of
achieving satisfaction and contentment.
Proponents both of the unjust and of the just reading concur that it
looks unlikely that Judah is ever going to suffer legal punitive action; he
appears to have ‘got away with murder’ as far as that potentially detrimental
consequence is concerned. It is with regard to the other types of effect that
disagreement arises. The unjust reading maintains that Judah’s marriage has
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Figure 5: Ben (Sam Waterston) with his daughter (Grace Zimmerman).
been happily restored – Judah ‘escapes unscathed into the everloving arms
of his wife’ – and he has suffered no diminution of his social status, career
prospects, wealth and so forth; neither do any of these features of his life seem
at risk of collapse, certainly not as a consequence of the crime he committed.16
Moreover, his remorseful (or simply self-interested?) anxiety now appears to
be behind him, and his worldly success set to continue.
Meanwhile, the just reading, as we have seen, insists that despite the
façade of Judah’s having avoided personal or domestic strife, or problems
with work or money, there are clear indications that his psychological worries
will continue to plague him, and perhaps contribute to an impoverishment of
his personal relationships. Peter Minowitz, for example, notes that, despite
Ben’s blindness, ‘he can at least be seen by all’, whereas Judah is forced to
keep his true self hidden from view, thereby placing inevitable stress on his
marriage and friendships.17 This indicates to Minowitz that the film may,
after all, contain a hint that, regardless of the truth or falsity of religious
doctrines, the faithful and law-keeping believer, as Judah’s devout father
asserts, ‘still [has] a better life than all those that doubt’.18
In light of their consequentialist conception of justice, proponents of the
just or of the unjust reading would have to admit that the credibility of their
respective interpretations depends on how things go for Judah – or (given that
it is a fictional work about which we are talking) upon what seems to be the
most plausible account of what will happen to him. It thus turns out to be a
contingent matter whether he gets away with murder and an empirical matter
how one would determine whether he has done so. If he prospers and lives
a life untroubled by remorse, then the unjust view seems vindicated; if his
conscience persistently unsettles him, generating mental anguish and perhaps
destabilising his familial and social relationships, then there are grounds for
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accepting the just reading. However, the question that demands to be asked
at this point is whether the consequentialist conception of justice is the only
one available, and if it is not, are there nevertheless good reasons for thinking
it is the one most applicable to Crimes and Misdemeanors?
One alternative to a consequentialist conception of justice with a long
pedigree in moral philosophy sees justice not so much in terms of the expe-
riential consequences for the agent, but in terms of the implications for the
person’s character or soul. This alternative conception might be dubbed the
intrinsic justice view, for it maintains that the detrimental effects of a morally
vicious action, and the correspondingly positive effects of a virtuous action,
for the person who performs it are intrinsic, or internal, to the action itself;
in other words, the very performance of an evil action is in itself a terrible
fate to befall a person’s soul or moral character. Versions of this intrinsic
justice view have been propounded by many philosophers from at least the
time of Plato’s Socrates onwards. Below I shall quote three representative
passages, from Plato’s Gorgias, Boethius’ Consolations of Philosophy and
Kierkegaard’s Purity of Heart respectively.
In the Gorgias, a conversation takes place between Socrates and Polus in
which Socrates affirms that someone who kills another unjustly is worthy not
of contempt but of pity, because such a killer is, necessarily, miserable: not
miserable in a psychological or subjective sense, but in the sense that the
person’s soul has been debased. ‘Surely’, Polus responds, ‘the one who’s put
to death unjustly is the one who’s both to be pitied and miserable’, to which
Socrates replies: ‘Less so than the one putting him to death . . . and less than
the one who’s justly put to death’. ‘How can that be . . . ?’, Polus asks, and
Socrates replies: ‘It’s because doing what’s unjust is actually the worst thing
there is.’19
Socrates, then, contends that a murderer, who kills unjustly, is more
pitiable than either the victim, who has been killed unjustly, or someone
who has been justly killed, because, as he says, acting unjustly is ‘the worst
thing there is’. By acting unjustly we make ourselves objectively miserable
and hence pitiable. This, at any rate, is the view that Plato, through the
character of Socrates, is prompting us to contemplate. We are being invited
to perceive justice under a different aspect, in a different light from that which
the consequentialist view casts.
An extension of the view of justice articulated by Socrates in the Gorgias
is the idea that for someone who has committed a crime, it is better to suffer
worldly justice than to go scot free. This idea is taken up by Boethius (c. 475-
524 CE), who places into the mouth of the personification of philosophy the
assertion that, ‘when the wicked receive punishment they receive something
good, the punishment itself, which is good, because of its justice’. It follows
from this, the voice of philosophy continues, that the wicked ‘are burdened
with heavier punishment precisely when they are believed to escape it’.20
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The thought expressed here is that the injustice for which one who com-
mits a wicked act is responsible can be mitigated by means of worldly pun-
ishment: if the punishment is genuinely warranted and just, then it is good,
and hence its application to the wrongdoer contributes towards returning the
wrongdoer from a state of wickedness to one of virtue and goodness. While
such punishment – willingly received – cannot undo the wicked action, it
can at least provide a counterweight, thereby leaving the wrongdoer in a
less wretched condition than he or she would have been had the crime gone
entirely without worldly redress.
Corresponding to Socrates’ doctrine that the wicked make themselves mis-
erable by means of their own actions irrespective of what judgement the world
makes upon them, is the doctrine that the innocent cannot really be punished
– that is, cannot suffer what might be called an eternal punishment, as dis-
tinct from a merely temporal or worldly one – no matter what the world
might do to them. Søren Kierkegaard gives voice to this view when he writes
that ‘even if the world gathered all its strength, there is one thing it is not
able to do, it can no more punish an innocent one than it can put a dead
person to death’. ‘To be sure the world has power’, Kierkegaard continues.
‘It can lay many a burden upon the innocent one. It can make his life sour
and laborious for him. It can rob him of his life. But it cannot punish an
innocent one.’21
Needless to say, the mere quoting of these passages, from Plato, Boethius
and Kierkegaard, provides no basis either for accepting the perspective they
embody or for supposing that perspective to be the one from which a film
such as Crimes and Misdemeanors ought to be understood. However, they
poignantly illustrate an alternative conception of justice to that which is
presupposed in what I have called the just and unjust readings of Allen’s film.
What I now intend to do is to highlight some aspects of the film which suggest
that this alternative standpoint – the intrinsic justice view – may not only
feature in a plausible interpretation of it, but may inform an interpretation
that discovers in the film ethical and religious resonances that would otherwise
be liable to be overlooked.
V. ASPECTS OF CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS
CONDUCIVE TO THE INTRINSIC JUSTICE VIEW
Although there may be some truth in Sam Girgus’s proposal that Professor
Levy’s ‘concluding voice-over of optimistic moral reassurance . . . constitutes
. . . a form of . . . self-reflexive parody on Allen’s part’, it seems reasonable to
regard this voiceover’s prominent role in the film’s epilogue as imbuing it –
or at least going some distance towards imbuing it – with the authority of
the film’s own self-interpretation.22 Some of its phraseology can be read as
a condensed manifesto of Sartrean existentialism, but also as evoking some
version of the intrinsic justice view that I outlined above.23 Through this
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disembodied monologue, Levy declares, for instance, that ‘we define ourselves
by the choices we have made. We are in fact the sum total of our choices’.
And he goes on to state that, despite the universe’s indifference to human
affairs, we can give meaning to that universe through ‘our capacity to love’. As
the accompanying visual image settles on the tender dance between Ben and
his daughter, the voiceover avers that ‘most human beings seem to have the
ability to keep trying, and even to find joy from simple things, like their family,
their work, and from the hope that future generations might understand
more’.
Here, then, we have an explicit endorsement of the view that our choices,
and most notably our choices to act, or not to act, from a motive of love, are
what define us – they make us who we are – followed by a verbal and visual
celebration of the humble and life-affirming attitude exhibited by Ben. The
viewer is thus invited to reflect upon what various characters in the film have
made of themselves, upon what they have done to their moral integrity by
means of the choices they have made. And it goes without saying that the key
character here is Judah. From the consequentialist perspective assumed by
the just and unjust readings of the film, if Judah avoids worldly disgrace and
psychological affliction, then he can be considered happy. Meanwhile, from
the perspective of intrinsic justice, especially as elaborated in the passage
from Boethius cited above, the more Judah evades these aggravations, the
more wretched he becomes: by overcoming his pangs of guilt, he does not
transcend his moral debasement, but debases himself still further.
In an earlier scene, when Judah is struggling to decide whether to have
Dolores murdered, he imagines himself conversing with Ben, as though Ben
were a personification of his conscience. He says to the imagined Ben, ‘I push
one button and I can sleep again at nights’, to which Ben returns, ‘Could
you sleep with that? Is that who you really are?’ This question of character
– of who one truly is – is at the heart of the film. Judah makes a pretence
of being virtuous, of being a decent, philanthropic, law-abiding citizen; and
when it comes to the crunch, he chooses the pretence over the reality, selling
his soul for the sake of what he conceives to be a convenient life.
I adverted earlier to Peter Minowitz’s remark that Crimes and Misde-
meanors ‘does not refute [Judah’s father’s] claim that even if his religious
beliefs turned out to be false, he would “still have a better life than all those
that doubt.”’24 But there is a question here about what having a ‘better’ life
consists in. By the end of the film, we have been exposed to a wide range of
ethical and religious perspectives, and we may reasonably ask which of them
conduce towards the best sort of life. There is, for example, Judah’s brother,
Jack, with his cynical amorality. There is Cliff, a basically well-meaning guy
who copes with his serial misfortunes by means of ironic self-deprecating wit.
There is Ben, with his heartfelt affirmation of ‘a moral structure with real
meaning and forgiveness and some kind of higher power’. And there is Judah
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himself, a complex character who, on the surface, perceives himself as a sec-
ular agnostic, but who cannot quite break free from the Judaic convictions
with which he was inculcated as a child.
The film does not make it easy for the viewer to disentangle moral from
pragmatic considerations. If we take a ‘better life’ to be one containing more
pleasure and less distress, then some might presume that, say, going blind at
a relatively young age is to count against such a life. Yet Ben’s abundant
faith seems able to absorb such an apparent misfortune, to transform it into
one component of a greater whole rather than construing it as an obstacle in
the path to happiness. So, with Ben as an example, we might be tempted to
suppose that there are pragmatic, prudential, reasons for adopting his ethical
and religious standpoint. When we turn to Judah, however, we see a man
whose life, from a non-moral perspective, seems to have turned out better
than that of the likes of Cliff. Yet, in moral terms, Judah’s life is a sham and
a disaster. He is, to paraphrase Boethius, ‘burdened with heavier punishment
precisely when he is believed to escape it’ – not an emotional burden, but
the non-subjective burden of a contaminated soul. From the intrinsic justice
perspective, the pragmatic motivations for pursuing a principled life pale into
insignificance when compared to the moral ones.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In light of the considerations I have brought forward, we can see that those
who would invoke Crimes and Misdemeanors as an instance of a film that
offers a counterexample to the thesis that crime necessarily does not pay,
betray an unwarrantedly narrow conception of the film’s possible interpre-
tations. Notwithstanding the hostile and simplistic condemnations of many
reviewers, Crimes and Misdemeanors is not a straightforward portrayal of
someone getting away with murder. Or rather, to view it in these terms is
to do an injustice to the interpretive possibilities that it affords. Instead, the
film may be seen as a complex mesh of tragic and comedic strands that in-
vites a reflective response from its audience. It achieves this result by means
of its personification of a variety of moral perspectives in its several charac-
ters: ‘A plurality of independent and unmerged voices’ (to borrow a phrase
from Mikhail Bakhtin’s description of Dostoevsky’s novels).25 Although the
characters express highly contrastive viewpoints, none of them is a mere car-
icature.
I have argued that, as long as the viewer remains constrained by a con-
sequentialist conception of justice, the range of interpretive options will be
unduly restricted. From the consequentialist standpoint, Judah is viewed as
having ‘got away with murder’ provided he suffers no significant ill effects,
such as legal sanctions, disruption of personal relationships or psychological
distress; and he is viewed as having failed to ‘get away with it’ provided he
does suffer one or more of these deleterious consequences. On these interpre-
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tations, it becomes a contingent matter whether he gets away with it or not,
and an empirical matter whether we should judge that he has.
Meanwhile, from an alternative perspective, which I have called the per-
spective of intrinsic justice, the relationship between immorality and punish-
ment is internal and hence necessary: if one acts immorally, then there is no
question of getting away with it, since the action itself is its own punishment,
in the sense that it debases one’s moral character – and this is the worst thing
that could happen to anyone. This perspective has a noble tradition behind
it, from Plato’s Socrates onwards, and, although Woody Allen’s film does not
unambiguously propagate this stance, there are reasons for maintaining that
it facilitates an interpretation of the film that is at least as plausible as any
rival interpretation. Indeed, although I am entirely open to an interpretive
pluralism – according to which there need be no single ‘correct’ interpretation
of a work of art such as a film – I am inclined to say that the intrinsic justice
view brings out possible moral and religious depths in Crimes and Misde-
meanors that would otherwise be missed – and which have been overlooked
by those who see the film as a patent illustration of the view that crime (at
least sometimes) pays.
By presenting a rich mosaic of moral and religious perspectives, and
prompting us, as viewers, to reflect deeply upon our reactions to the deci-
sions made by different characters, Woody Allen’s masterpiece offers us a
mirror in which to scrutinise our own ethical and religious attitudes and val-
ues. It cannot reasonably be reduced to a simple illustration of a crude ethical
thesis or counter-thesis.26
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NOTES
1See, inter alia, Russell 2000.
2For the full cast list, see the entry
in the Internet Movie Database 2019 (ac-
cessed 11 June 2019).
3See, e.g., McGrady 1989.
4All quotations from the film are my
transcriptions from the DVD (Allen 1989).
5Pally 1989, 12.
6The character who speaks this line is
Halley Reed (Mia Farrow), a film-producer
with whom Cliff wishes to become both
professionally and romantically involved.
7Wieseltier 1989.
8Erler 1989, and Denzin 1991, 95.
9Denzin 1991, 95. Cf. Vipond 1991,
102: ‘Apart from the odd twinge of guilt
from time to time, he [Judah] suffers no
punishment for his crime. His Aunt May’s
statement that if a person commits a mur-
der, gets away with it, and chooses not to
be bothered by the ethics of situation [sic],
then he’s home free, is borne out by the
film’s conclusion.’ It should be noted, how-
ever, that Vipond adds: ‘But Allen doesn’t
leave it at that.’
10Woody Allen in a written interview by
Sander Lee, quoted in Lee 2001, 77.
11Erler 1989; also quoted in Girgus 2002,
129. See also Minowitz 1991, 79: ‘By
making Judah “prosper” and the Rabbi go
blind, the film seems to mock [Judah’s fa-
ther’s] faith that God ultimately punishes
the unrighteous and rewards the just.’
12Minowitz 1991, 83 (see also 86). The
dreadful parallel between Levy’s suicide
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and the death of Primo Levi in 1987 has
occasionally been pointed out (e.g. Lee
2001, 60), though whether Primo Levi’s
death was suicide remains disputed (Gam-
betta 1999).
13Lee 2001, 76, 77.
14Roche 1995, 552.
15Quattrocchi 1991, 91. See also Blake
1991, 65: ‘In his blindness, [Ben] sees a re-
ality closed from Judah, the ophthalmolo-
gist, and Cliff, the filmmaker.’
16Liggera 1990, 102.
17Minowitz 1991, 80.
18Sol Rosenthal (David S. Howard),
quoted in Minowitz 1991, 80.
19Plato, Gorgias, 469a-b (1997, 813).
20Boethius 1969, 129, 130 (Consolations
IV.4). Cf. Roche 1995, 557, who also
quotes this passage.
21Kierkegaard 1847, 97. Cf. Winch
1966, in which this passage from
Kierkegaard is discussed in relation to pas-
sages from other authors, including Plato
and Wittgenstein.
22Girgus 2002, 145.
23‘In the voiceover narration . . . Allen
gives us one of the best short descriptions
of existential beliefs I have ever heard or
read’ (Lee 2001, 57).
24Minowitz 1991, 80.
25Bakhtin 1965, 6, original italics omit-
ted.
26This article has had a long gesta-
tion period. Shorter versions were origi-
nally delivered at the Religion, the Arts,
and the Creative Imagination conference,
Heythrop College, London, May 2008, and
at the Philosophy and Film / Film and
Philosophy conference, University of the
West of England, Bristol, July 2008. I
am grateful to the respective organisers
of those events and to members of both
audiences for helpful comments and ques-
tions. I have also benefited from conversa-
tions with Sue Richardson and from com-
ments by Aaron Meskin on an earlier draft.
Research for the article was assisted by a
Royal Institute of Philosophy bursary.
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